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In the 1990s macroeconomic policies improved in a majority of developing countries, but 
the growth dividend from such improvement fell short of expectations, and a policy 
agenda focused on stability turned out to be associated with a multiplicity of financial 
crises.  This paper takes a retrospective look at the contents and implementation of the 
macroeconomic reform agenda of the 1990s. It reviews the progress achieved with fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies across the developing world, and the effectiveness 
of the changing policy framework in promoting stability and growth. The main lesson is 
that slow growth and frequent crises resulted, more often than not, from shortcomings in 
the reform agenda of the 1990s.  These shortcomings essentially concern the depth and 
breadth of the macro reform agenda, its attention to macro vulnerabilities, and the 
complementary reforms outside the macroeconomic sphere.   
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Among developing countries, the decade of the 1990s was characterized by two 
major macroeconomic developments. Macroeconomic policies, as traditionally measured, 
improved in a majority of countries, but the growth benefits expected from the adoption 
of better policies failed to materialize -- at least to the extent expected by many observers.  
In addition, despite the improvement in macroeconomic policies the decade witnessed a 
proliferation of financial crises that in many cases had severe adverse effects on 
economic growth and poverty in the countries involved.   
 
What is the relationship between these two developments?  This paper argues that 
both slow growth and multiple crises were symptomatic of deficiencies in the design and 
execution of the pro-growth reform strategy adopted in the 1990s, of which 
macroeconomic stability was viewed as the centerpiece.
1   
 
Specifically, the paper’s contention is that, from a growth-enhancing perspective, 
the gains in macroeconomic stability achieved during the 1990s were limited on several 
counts: 
 
i. Improvements in macroeconomic stability were far from universal. While this is hardly 
surprising, the consequence is that macro instability continued to impede growth in some 
countries and allowed traditional macro imbalances to generate crises during the 1990s 
similar in many ways to those of the 1980s. 
 
ii. Gains in macroeconomic policy realizations were much more widespread than those 
achieved in reforming the rules and institutions governing the formulation of macro 
policies. Such reforms ultimately determine whether policy improvements will be long-
lasting -- and will be perceived as such by the private sector. The limited progress on that 
front likely undermined the contribution of macro policy improvements -- even where 
they could indeed have been sustained ex post -- to raising economic growth. 
 
iii. Even in countries that took radical steps toward macroeconomic stabilization, the 
macroeconomic agenda of the 1990s tended to be incomplete, in that it failed to address 
macroeconomic fragilities -- most notably those arising from the financial system and the 
capital account. Inappropriate policies toward the domestic financial sector and the 
capital account of the balance of payments left many stabilizing economies highly 
vulnerable to adverse shocks and proved to be the Achilles heel of macroeconomic 
stability in some of the most important crises of the 1990s.  
 
iv. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, gains in macroeconomic stability were often 
not complemented with necessary growth-enhancing reforms in other parts of the 
economy. To put it differently, the growth payoff of macroeconomic stability per se may 
have been oversold. Macro instability hampers investors’ ability and willingness to 
undertake investment opportunities -- understood in the broadest sense of the term. But 
                                                 
1 Easterly (2001) also states the view that the multiple crises of the 1990s represent a symptom of, rather 
than an “explanation” for, the slow growth of the 1990s.   3
for macro stability to deliver growth, those opportunities must exist in the first place. 
Their creation is a task that belongs mainly to other areas of reform – specifically to 
microeconomic reforms and to a variety of institutional reforms.  In short, macro stability 
can help, but it cannot by itself deliver growth. 
 
In a nutshell, our argument is that while slow growth and frequent crises reflected 
insufficient policy improvement in some cases, more generally these phenomena resulted 
from shortcomings in the reform agenda of the 1990s -- in terms of the depth of macro 
reforms, the avoidance of macro fragilities and the overall breadth of the reform agenda.  
The rest of this paper develops this argument by taking a retrospective look at the 
macroeconomic reform agenda of the 1990s. Section II reviews progress in implementing 
the reform agenda during the past decade.  Section III evaluates the effectiveness of what 
was done from the perspective of promoting economic growth and discusses how a 
policy agenda focused on macroeconomic stability turned out to be associated with a 
multiplicity of crises.  Finally, Section IV examines the lessons that can be drawn from 
the experience of the 1990s.  These lessons essentially concern the depth and breadth of 
the macro reform agenda, its attention to macro vulnerabilities, and the importance of 
complementary reforms outside the macroeconomic sphere.   
 
II. The Facts of the 1990s 
 
  How did macroeconomic stability evolve over the 1990s?  Answering this 
question requires first a clarification of the meaning of macroeconomic stability and of 
the way to measure it empirically. Conceptually, macroeconomic instability refers to 
phenomena that decrease the predictability of the domestic macroeconomic environment, 




Macroeconomic instability can take the form of volatility of key macroeconomic 
variables or of unsustainability in their behavior (which predicts future volatility).  This 
section examines the gains in macroeconomic stability achieved by developing countries 
during the 1990s by looking at the behavior of macroeconomic outcome variables such as 
the rate of growth of real output, the rate of inflation and the current account deficit. The 
scrutiny focuses on the volatility of the growth rate and the levels of inflation and the 
current account deficit.
3 But observed changes in the behavior of these endogenous 
variables can reflect changes in the macroeconomic policy environment and/or 
exogenous shocks. To sort out the roles of these two factors, the review looks separately 
at the behavior of macroeconomic policy variables -- capturing fiscal, monetary and 
                                                 
2 In recent years there has been a renewal of interest, sparked by Ramey and Ramey (1995), in the adverse 
effects that real and nominal instability can have on economic growth, as documented by a growing 
empirical literature on the subject. For a recent evaluation, see Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004). 
3 The level of inflation is strongly associated with its volatility, as well as with the volatility of (inter- and 
intra-temporal) relative prices.  For these reasons, and because high levels of inflation are likely to be 
viewed as unsustainable, inflation itself is commonly taken as a summary indicator of instability. In turn, 
the external current-account deficit is commonly viewed as a leading indicator of future instability, with 
excessively large -- and thus unsustainable -- deficits often predicting an impeding macroeconomic crisis. 
   4
exchange rate policies -- as well as that of exogenous shocks to developing countries, 
both real and financial. In the case of the policy variables, the assessment concerns 
whether the policy configuration tended to evolve toward a fiscal stance safely consistent 
with solvency, a monetary policy stance consistent with a low and stable rate of inflation, 
and a robust (non-crisis prone) exchange rate regime that avoids persistent under- or 
over-valuation of the currency as well as excessive volatility of the real exchange rate.  
The discussion of external shocks assesses whether developing countries faced a more or 
less challenging (unstable) external environment in the 1990s than in previous decades.  
 
II.1 Stability of Macroeconomic Outcomes  
 
By either of the measures mentioned above, developing countries have 
traditionally been characterized by a much higher degree of macroeconomic instability 
than industrial economies, and there is a widespread perception that the problem has been 
getting worse.
4  In spite of that perception, however, the volatility of key macroeconomic 
aggregates actually declined in the 1990s across the developing world.
5  For example, the 
standard deviation of per-capita GDP growth fell from 4 percent in the 1970s and 1980s 
to about 3 percent in the 1990s, although it still remained significantly above the 
comparable figure for industrial economies (1.5 percent) (Figure II.1).
 6 
7  The reduction 
in GDP volatility was widespread, but far from universal: of the 77 developing countries 
for which complete information is available over the period 1960-2000, approximately 
one third (27 countries) experienced an increase in growth volatility in the 1990s relative 
to the 1980s.   
 
It is worth noting that the decline in aggregate volatility extends also to other 
variables more directly related to individuals’ welfare, such as income and consumption 
growth, although to varying extents. In particular, the volatility of private consumption 
growth also declined relative to the previous decade, but mainly in low-income 
developing countries. In middle-income countries consumption volatility remained 




                                                 
4 See IADB (1995), De Ferranti et al (2000) and Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001). The popular view that 
instability is on the rise is documented by Rodrik (2001). 
5 Here the focus is on a sample of 97 countries with population above 500,000 possessing complete 
information on real GDP growth over the period 1960-2000.  The population lower limit is set to exclude 
highly volatile island economies. The total sample includes 20 industrial and 77 developing economies, of 
which three (Israel, Hong Kong and Singapore) are higher-income non-OECD countries. 
6 The decline in developing-country volatility over the 1990s is documented also by Rodrik (2001), De 
Ferranti et al  (2000) and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004). The same result holds if volatility is measured by 
a robust statistic such as the inter-quartile range instead of the standard deviation. 
7 The decline in volatility was statistically significant: formal tests strongly reject the hypothesis that the 
cross-country distribution of growth volatility did not change between the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the 
hypothesis that the changes in volatility across the two decades are centered at zero. 
8 The information on private consumption is available only for a slightly smaller country sample. The fact 
that consumption volatility declined less than income and output volatility in the 1990s is also underscored 
by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003), and has been viewed as a failure of financial openness to provide the 
consumption-smoothing mechanism predicted by conventional theory.   5
 
However, the reduction in aggregate output volatility concealed the increasing 
role of extreme instability. Large growth disturbances accounted in the 1990s for a higher 
proportion of overall instability than in previous decades. This was due to the increased 
contribution of large negative shocks, which in the last decade accounted for close to 
one-fourth of total growth volatility, against 14 percent in the 1960s and 1970s and 18 
percent in the 1980s (Figure II.2).
9  The increasing incidence of growth crises affected 
not only countries that suffered rising volatility (such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea) 
but also countries whose growth volatility declined in the 1990s. This was the case, for 
example, of Madagascar (which suffered a large drop in GDP in 1991), Mexico and 
Ecuador. 
 
                                                 
9 Negative extreme shocks also accounted for a larger fraction of the total volatility of gross national 
income and consumption in the 1990s than in previous decades. In technical terms, the frequency 
distribution of growth rates shows heavier left tails in the 1990s. For both GDP and consumption growth, 








ALL (97) IND (20) LDC (77) MIDDLE (41) LOW (33)
Figure II.1: GDP Growth Volatility
(percent, medians by income group)
66-70 71-80 81-90 91-00
Sources: WDI-WB; Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004).  6
 
Aside from output volatility, other key outcome variables commonly taken as 
indicators of aggregate stability exhibited an improving pattern in the 1990s. For 
example, the median inflation rate across middle-income developing countries declined 
from a peak of 16 percent in 1990 to 6 percent in 2000. Among low-income countries, 
inflation peaked in 1994-95, in the wake of the devaluation of the CFA franc, and then 
followed a declining pattern (Figure II.3). Yet over most of the 1990s, the gap between 
industrial and developing country median inflation rates remained substantial by the 
standards of the 1960s and 1970s.   
 
Likewise, the incidence of high inflation among developing countries peaked in 
1991, and then declined sharply (Figure II.4). However, the decline only took hold in the 
mid-1990s, and thus the number of developing countries (among those with complete 
data) experiencing average inflation above 50 percent over the decade as a whole was 
unchanged between the 1980s and the 1990s. 
 
Other things equal, reduced aggregate volatility and lower inflation likely had a 
positive impact on the incomes of the poor. The inflation tax tends to fall 
disproportionately on lower income households, who hold few or no financial assets 
offering shelter against rising prices, and whose wage earnings typically are not fully 
indexed to inflation. Likewise, through this and other channels, higher aggregate 
volatility is empirically associated with worsening income distribution.
10 
                                                 
10 On the relation between macroeconomic volatility and poverty, see Laursen and Mahajan (2004). The 










61-70 71-80 81-90 91-00
Figure II.2. Structure of GDP Growth Volatility 
(percent, mean of 77 developing countries)
Normal Extreme Crisis Boom
Sources: Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004); authors' calculations.
Notes: Total volatility = Normal + Extreme; Extreme = Crisis + Boom. Extreme shocks are defined as those exceeding two 




Figure II.3: Inflation Rates, 1961-2000






































































































IND (20) LDC (77) MIDDLE (41) LOW (33)
Source: WDI-WB.


























































































Above 50% Above 80 %
Source: WDI-WB.  8
In turn, median current account deficits among developing countries increased 
slightly in the 1990s, although there was a contrast between middle and low-income 
developing economies.
11  In the former, the median current account deficit/GDP ratio fell 
by about one percentage point relative to the 1970s and 1980s.
12  In the latter, it rose by 
about half a point vis-à-vis the 1980s to exceed 5 percent of GDP in the 1990s (Figure 




II.2 Policy Stability 
 
Conventional indicators of policy stability also showed an improvement over the 
1990s. Most notably, the overall fiscal deficit fell across the developing world from a 
median value of 6-7 percent of GDP in the early 1980s to 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s 
before rebounding to about 3 percent by the end of the decade.  The fiscal correction was 
particularly pronounced among middle-income countries. (Figure II.6). 
 
                                                 
11 The availability of data on the other indicators presented in the rest of this section is in general much 
more limited than in the case of growth and inflation. For this reason, the figures below refer to the 
universe of countries for which information on the variable of interest is available over the entire period 
shown. This set varies across different variables, and therefore the conclusions of the analysis have to be 
taken with some caution. 
12 In part, however, this apparent improvement reflects the “sudden stop” of capital inflows to crisis-











ALL (70) IND (17) LDC (53) MIDDLE (32) LOW (19)
Figure II.5: Current Account
(percent of GDP, medians by country income group)
66-70 71-80 81-90 91-01
Sources: WDI-WB  and BoP4-IMF.  
Note: The countries featured are those for which data are available over the entire period shown.   9
 
 
However, the overall balance is affected by the trajectory of interest rates on 
public debt, which is beyond the direct control of the authorities, and thus the primary 
balance likely offers a more accurate measure of fiscal stance. Its evolution over the 
1990s, shown in Figure II.7, displays a clear trend in the direction of increasing surpluses, 
particularly after 1995. By the end of the decade, the median developing country showed 
a primary surplus -- although a much more modest one than that of industrial countries.
13  
 
                                                 
13 Other measures of fiscal policy stability also showed an improvement. For example, the volatility of 
public spending (as measured by the standard deviation of public consumption growth) declined sharply 
among middle-income countries. Among lower-income economies, however, it showed little change 













1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure II.6: Developing Countries' Overall Fiscal Balance 
(percent of GDP, medians by country income group)
LDC (37) MIDDLE (29) LOW (8)
Sources: WDI-WB and IIF. 
Note: The countries featured are those for which complete data are available from late 1970s on. The availability of 
consistent fiscal balance data is very limited, particularly for low-income countries.  10
 
 
It is more difficult to gauge monetary stability, given the diversity of monetary 
arrangements across developing countries and over time.  One rough measure is the resort 
to seigniorage -- i.e., money financing of the deficit.  Measured by the change in the 
monetary base relative to GDP, seigniorage collection showed a rising trend in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and then declined in both middle-income and (more modestly) 
low-income economies, a pattern roughly similar to that of the inflation rate shown 
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Figure II.7: Primary Fiscal Balance, 1990-2002
(percent of GDP, medians by country income group)
ALL (61) IND (20) LDC (41)
Source: FITCH.




The diversity of exchange rate arrangements across countries also makes it hard to 
gauge exchange rate policy. One indirect approach looks at the trends in real exchange 
rates.
14  The evidence (Shvets, 2004) shows that real exchange rates depreciated over the 
1990s in a majority of developing economies.  In turn, real exchange rate volatility
15 
showed a decline from the record-highs of the 1980s. But the decline was limited to 
middle-income countries, and over the 1990s developing countries as a group continued 
to exhibit much higher real exchange rate volatility than industrial countries (Figure II.9).  
 
                                                 
14 These are of course endogenous and subject to the influence of a variety of factors. While the nominal 
exchange rate is only one of such factors, it is arguably an important one. 
15 Measured by the standard deviation of its rate of change.  
Figure II.8: Developing Countries: Seigniorage Revenues, 1966-2001

















































































MIDDLE (34) LOW (30)
Sources: IMF-IFS and WDI-WB.
Note: The countries featured are those for which data are available over the entire period shown.   12
 
 
This high volatility of the real exchange rate was in part a reflection of the high 
incidence of exchange-rate crashes in the decade, when, as Figure II.10 shows, large 
devaluations were a frequent phenomenon. Their incidence peaked in 1994 (with the 
devaluation of the CFA Franc) and 1998 (with the East Asia and Russia crises). Taking 
the decade as a whole, exchange rate crashes were slightly less frequent in the 1990s than 
in the 1980s, but much more so than in the 1960s and 1970s.
16 High real exchange-rate 
volatility and frequent exchange-rate collapses suggest that over the 1990s progress in 
achieving robust nominal exchange rate arrangements was limited. 
 
                                                 
16 In a smaller country sample (whose time coverage ends in 1997), Bordo et al (2001) also find that the 











ALL (80) IND (19) LDC (61) MIDDLE (32) LOW (26)
Figure II.9: Real Exchange Rate Volatility, 1961-2000
(percent, medians by income group)
61-70 71-80 81-90 91-00
Source: WPENN Table.
Note: Figure shows the standard deviation of the rate of change in the real exchange rate. The countries featured are 
those for which data are available over the entire period shown.   13
 
 
II.3 The External Environment 
 
  The final ingredient behind the observed trends in macroeconomic instability is 
the pattern of external real and financial shocks. Indeed, the rapid propagation (or 
“contagion”) of external financial disturbances is viewed by many observers as an 
important contributor to the major crises of the 1990s.  
  
Regarding real disturbances, Shvets (2004) has documented the relatively modest 
magnitude of terms-of-trade shocks affecting developing countries in the 1990s. The 
volatility of the terms of trade declined in all developing regions, in most cases to levels 
comparable to those of the 1960s. The only exception was the Middle East and North 
Africa region, where terms-of-trade volatility was nevertheless below the levels of the 
1970s and 1980s.  
 
It is more difficult to assess the volatility of the financial environment.  Though 
the behavior of interest rates in the world’s major financial markets captures some of this 
volatility, the terms on which capital is available to developing countries incorporate risk 
premia that tend to be much more volatile than industrial-country interest rates.  On the 
other hand, volatility measures based on such premia or on the behavior of capital flows 
are not necessarily good indicators of the volatility of the international financial 
environment, since they are partly endogenous to events in the borrowing countries 
themselves.   
 



























































































LDC (77) MIDDLE (41) LOW (33)
Source: IMF-IFS. 
Note: For this figure an exchange rate crisis is defined as in Frankel and Rose (1996): a depreciation of the (average) 
nominal exchange rate that (a) exceeds 25 percent, (b) exceeds the preceding year’s rate of nominal depreciation by at 
least 10 percent, and (c) is at least three years apart from any previous crisis. The countries featured are those for which 
data is available over the entire period shown.   14
Keeping this caveat in mind, Figure II.11 portrays the volatility of international 
net capital flows as measured by their standard deviation. Like real volatility captured by 
the terms of trade, this measure suggests that the volatility of the external financial 
environment also decreased relative to the 1980s. The decline was modest, however, so 
that during the 1990s capital flows to developing countries remained much more volatile 




A number of observers have pointed out that large capital flow reversals -- often 
termed “sudden stops” -- can be much more damaging for developing economies than 
general capital-flow variability, as such abrupt stoppages force costly and disruptive real 
adjustments.
17  Figure II.12 offers a perspective on the incidence of such reversals among 
developing countries during the 1990s. By the measure used here, there was little change 
relative to the 1980s in the frequency of sudden stops. Their incidence declined in the 
first half of the 1990s, but then rose again in the second half, peaking around the time of 
the East Asia and Russia crises.
18 
                                                 
17 See Calvo (1998), Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Mendoza (2001).  However, note again that capital 
flow turnarounds do not necessarily represent exogenous shifts in international investors’ sentiment. They 
reflect in part the effects of developments in the destination economies (resulting, among other factors, 
from changing domestic policies) as well as in international financial markets affecting the perceived risk 
and return differentials from investing in different markets.  
18 To keep things in perspective, it should be noted that the incidence of capital flow reversals among 
industrial countries (not shown to avoid cluttering the graph) was also fairly high in the 1990s -- although 









IND (20) LDC (43) MIDDLE (31) LOW (7)
Figure II.11: Volatility of Net Capital Flows, 1977-2000
(percent, medians by country income group)
77-80 81-90 91-00
Source: IMF-IFS.
Note: Figure shows the standard deviation of net capital flows as percentage of GDP. Using instead the coefficient of 
variation leads to qualitatively similar results. The countries featured are those for which data is available over the entire 






  Over the 1990s developing countries achieved notable progress on fiscal 
consolidation and inflation performance.  Improved fiscal and nominal stability helped 
achieve a moderate reduction in output volatility, facilitated also by a somewhat more 
stable external environment. But the picture is far from rosy.  In terms of outcome 
variables, developing countries remain much more unstable than industrial ones. 
Moreover, extreme volatility accounted for a larger share of total volatility in the 1990s 
than previously.  This latter fact is consistent with evidence suggesting that instances of 
currency crashes and “sudden stops” in capital inflows did not tend to diminish during the 
1990s.  The picture is therefore one of dramatic policy improvements in some areas, of 
more moderate improvements in stability of macroeconomic outcomes, and of persistent 
vulnerability to extreme macroeconomic events. The next section relies on these findings 
to interpret the growth performance of developing countries during the 1990s.  
 
III. Assessing the Experience of the 1990s 
 
  The previous section has shown that macroeconomic performance improved 
along several important dimensions among developing countries during the decade of the 
1990s.  These improvements were largely driven by the quest for higher growth.  Yet as 
Pritchett (2004a) argued, the growth payoff from these macro performance gains fell 
short of expectations.  Why was this so?  To address this question, this section first 










































































































Stop > 5 percent of GDP Stop > 2.5 percent of GDP
Source: IMF-IFS. Balanced sample includes 53 countries. 
Note: Data for the first half of the 1970s are too limited to allow a comprehensive analysis. Sudden stops are defined as declines in net capital 
inflows in excess of a given percentage of GDP. Reversals are allowed to take place in adjacent years; using instead a 2-year window leads to 
similar qualitative conclusions. Note that reversals could have been defined instead in terms of (large) changes in the current account deficit (as 
done, for example, by Hutchison and Noy, 2002). However, when applied to a large cross-country sample such as the one at hand, the latter 
criterion tends to pick up numerous current account reversals (particularly in low-income countries) primarily due to terms-of-trade shocks in a 
context of modest changes in capital flows.  16
reviews the analytical links between macroeconomic stability and economic growth and 
then applies that analytical framework to the experience of the 1990s. 
 
III.1 From Stability to Growth 
 
As already noted, a stable macroeconomic policy environment features a fiscal 
stance safely consistent with fiscal solvency, a monetary policy stance consistent with a 
low and stable rate of inflation and a robust exchange-rate regime that avoids both 
systematic currency misalignment as well as excessive real exchange-rate volatility.  
Policy stability can foster stability of macroeconomic outcomes both directly -- by 
removing destabilizing policies themselves as sources of shocks -- as well as indirectly -- 
by allowing policies to be deployed as stabilizing instruments in response to exogenous 
destabilizing shocks, thus enhancing the stability of key outcome variables.
 But a stable 
policy framework is not an end in itself: it matters only for instrumental reasons, as a 
means to secure a more stable overall macroeconomic environment. 
 
On conceptual grounds, however, the link between policy stability and growth 
may turn out to be rather complex.  In particular: 
 
•  The direct contribution that policy stability can make to growth (by not being an 
additional source of instability) is likely to depend on the institutional setting.  In 
simple terms, what matters is not just whether policy realizations are good today, 
but the perceived likelihood that good policies will be repeatedly implemented in 
the future.  To have a significant impact on growth, actual gains in 
macroeconomic stability need to be viewed by the private sector as indicative of a 
permanent change in the macroeconomic policy regime.  
•  The potential indirect contribution of policy stability to growth -- by promoting 
outcomes stability -- is likely to depend on the economy’s degree of 
macroeconomic fragility -- i.e., the extent to which even relatively minor shocks 
can have large effects on the economy. On the one hand, fragility may make it too 
costly to deploy stabilization policies for fear of potentially adverse effects. The 
result is policy paralysis.  On the other hand, fragility can mean that the instability 
that policy has to counter may become so severe that feasible policy adjustments 
are unable to counter it.  
 
These two points suggest that the type of macroeconomic stability likely to be 
most conducive to economic growth -- durable outcomes-based stability -- 
involves much more than just moving fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies 
in stabilizing directions.  It also requires that policy-based stability be given a 
solid institutional underpinning, that sources of macroeconomic fragility be 
eliminated to the greatest possible extent and that the authorities actively exploit 
the scope for stabilization policy created by these two improvements in the 
macroeconomic environment.    
 
•  Finally, as already stressed, growth does not depend only on macroeconomic 
stability. In other words, the effectiveness of outcomes stability itself in   17
promoting economic growth is likely to depend on a variety of growth 
determinants, including microeconomic factors.  
 
The next section evaluates the reform agenda of the 1990s from this analytical 
perspective. 
 
III.2 How Much Progress Was Really Achieved in the 1990s? 
 
On the whole, as shown in Section II, there were significant achievements in 
terms of stability in the traditional macroeconomic policy sense during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. But these achievements were not universal; they were not always grounded 
on solid institutional foundations to guarantee their permanence; and they frequently did 
not translate into a more effective use of macro policies as stabilization instruments.   
 
A useful framework within which to organize discussion of these issues is the 
public sector solvency condition that requires the present value (PV) of primary surpluses 
and seigniorage revenue to be at least as large as the government’s outstanding stock of 
net debt, i.e.: 
 
                               PV (T – G + dM) ≥ B(0) 
 
From the viewpoint of macroeconomic policies, stability requires that the authorities set 
the monetary and fiscal policy stance consistently with maintaining the public sector’s 
solvency at low levels of inflation, while leaving at the same time some scope for 
mitigating the impact of real and financial shocks on macroeconomic performance. 
Obviously, the former requirement imposes constraints on the magnitudes of both the 
primary deficit (G - T) and its money financing dM, while the latter refers to the profiles 
of monetary and fiscal policy over the business cycle.   
 
Most importantly, these requirements apply not only to current policies, but also 
to future ones, as implied by the present value term in the expression. Indeed, one of the 
key dilemmas for macroeconomic policy-making is precisely how to achieve and convey 
to the private sector the assurance that future policies will abide by the requirements of 
solvency and low inflation -- without having to surrender the short-run stabilization 
capability of monetary and fiscal policy. As will be discussed later, many of the 
achievements and disappointments of the 1990s relate to the search for lasting solutions 
to this dilemma.  But first, reassessing developments during the 1990s in the light of the 
above expression, the following key observations emerge: 
 
i. A comfortable perception of fiscal solvency remains to be established in most countries.  
 
In spite of the trend toward lower fiscal deficits documented in Section II, public 
debt ratios remained high in most developing countries, and in general they showed little 
tendency to decline during the 1990s. Among the set of developing countries for which 
data are available, the median public debt/GDP ratio remained in the 50-60 percent range 
over the decade (Figure III.1).  An incipient decline through 1997 was followed by a   18
rising pattern after that date, so that by 2001-02 the median developing-country debt ratio 
exceeded the 1990-01 level -- as did the median industrial-country debt ratio.
19  The 
rising trend was particularly marked among low-income countries, although data 
availability is too limited to draw firm conclusions.
20  On the whole, for the 46 low- and 
middle-income countries in the sample underlying Figure III.1, debt/GDP ratios rose in 




This persistence of high debt over the 1990s -- and its upward drift at the end of 
the decade -- reflects a number of factors. First, improvements in fiscal performance were 
not universal.  In India, for example, continuing large primary deficits (averaging close to 
4 percent of GDP in the late 1990s) were the main factor behind persistent high debt 
ratios. More generally, fiscal vulnerabilities played a prominent role in some of the major 
financial crises of recent years -- Russia in 1998, Ecuador in 1999, and Argentina in 
2002.
21   
 
                                                 
19 The same pattern is found in IMF (2003a). 
20 It should be noted that debt/ GDP ratios do not accurately reflect the debt burdens faced by low-income 
developing countries relative to the other groups in Figure III.1, since the latter tend to have a large share of 
debt in concessional terms.  The focus here, however, is on changes in levels of debt over time within each 
group of countries.  
21 For example, in Argentina the expansionary fiscal stance followed in the 1995-97 boom left the 
authorities virtually no room to adjust to the global real and financial slowdown after the Russian crisis of 
1998 and to the real appreciation of the peso under the hard dollar peg; see Perry and Servén (2003).  On 
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Figure III.1: Government Debt, 1990-2002
(percent of GDP, medians by country income group)
IND (24) LDC (50) MIDDLE (35) LOW (12)
Sources: WDI-WB , WEO-IMF and FITCH.  19
In many cases, the pressure of weak public finances on debt accumulation was 
brought into the open by an attempt at rapid disinflation, which implied a drop in deficit 
monetization (as reflected by the decline in seigniorage revenues documented in section 
II).  In the absence of an equally rapid correction of the primary deficit, debt issuance was 
left as the only available source of financing.  The debt impact of disinflation is 
confirmed by the empirical fact that over the 1990s disinflation is associated with 
subsequent rises in debt ratios, and the association is statistically significant.  
 
But in a majority of developing countries primary deficits did decline over the 
1990s (as shown in Section II), and other factors accounted for the lion’s share of public 
debt accumulation. Key among these was the cost of banking-system bailouts, which was 
the main ingredient behind the increasing public-sector debt burden in a number of 
instances.
22  As Figure III.2 shows, some of the banking crises of the 1990s -- especially 
those of East Asia in 1997 -- ranked at the top of the historical record in terms of their 
fiscal impact.
23 Through this and other channels, involving implicit net transfers from 
poorer households to financial system participants in order to rescue and recapitalize the 
failed banks, such crises had adverse effects also on income distribution.
24 
 
                                                 
22 Beyond banking system bailouts, realization of other contingent liabilities, as well as recognition of 
hidden ones, was also a significant source of debt accumulation in some countries. Argentina is a good 
example; see Mussa (2002). 
23 However, Bordo et al (2001) find that the output cost of banking crises did not show any significant 
increase over the 1990s.  
24 See Halac and Schmukler (2003) for a detailed discussion.   20
 
 
Large real exchange-rate depreciations, in a context in which the bulk of public 
debt is denominated in (or indexed to) foreign currency, were another major factor behind 
the upward trend in debt stocks in the late 1990s. In Argentina and Uruguay, for example, 
the exchange-rate collapse of 2002 more than doubled the debt/GDP ratio -- from 50 to 
over 140 percent of GDP in Argentina and from 40 to over 80 percent in Uruguay. The 
predominance of foreign-currency-denominated debt in many countries reflects the 
weakness of domestic-currency debt markets, and in some cases also a myopic debt 
management strategy that selects the denomination of debt issuance on the basis of 
interest costs alone, neglecting both exchange-rate and interest-rate risk (see below). 
Across emerging markets, debt dollarization remained pervasive: the median ratio of 
foreign-currency debt to total public debt rose over the late 1990s to exceed 55 percent by 
2001 (Figure III.3). 
 























Figure III.2: Total Fiscal Costs of Systemic Banking Crises 
as a percent of GDP
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).
Note: (*) percent of GNP.  21
 
A third ingredient behind the persistence of high debt was the high level of real 
interest rates in many countries, particularly in the late 1990s, largely reflecting the lack 
of credibility in their stabilization efforts-documented below. Again, myopic debt 
management involving excessive reliance on short-maturity debt made some countries’ 
overall fiscal outcomes -- and thus their rates of public debt accumulation -- highly 
sensitive to changes in domestic interest rates.  Thus, in some countries (notably Brazil) 
high real interest rates contributed to a rapid pileup of public debt that further weakened 
perceptions of solvency and macroeconomic stability.  
 
In terms of the solvency constraint introduced earlier, the bottom line is that, 
through all these channels, increases in the observed value of the primary surplus T – G 
did not suffice in many countries to bring down the burden of public debt and establish a 
comfortable perception of fiscal solvency. 
 
A strong indication that solvency perceptions remained shaky in the 1990s is the 
fact that default risk premia, as measured by sovereign borrowing spreads in international 
markets, remained highly volatile for most emerging countries over the decade (Figure 
III.4).  The evidence suggests that default risk depends not only on debt burdens, but also 
on investors’ perceptions about the quality of borrowers’ policy and institutional 
framework.
25 Thus, the volatility of risk premia likely reflected -- among other factors -- 
the market’s lack of confidence in borrowers’ commitment to stability.   
                                                 
25 See Kraay and Nehru (2003). The fact that weak policies and institutions (or other factors) can result in 
high default risk even at moderate levels of debt has prompted recommendations for extra-cautious upper 











Figure III.3: Developing Countries' Foreign Currency Debt, 1997 and 2001
(percent of general government debt, medians by country income group)
LDC (45) MIDDLE (37) LOW (8)




But perceptions of high default risk are not just a symptom of perceived 
vulnerability.  They also contribute to undermining the achievement of durable outcomes-
based macroeconomic stability indirectly.  In particular, they hamper countries’ ability to 
conduct stabilizing policy: when default is perceived to be high and highly sensitive to 
changes in circumstances, attempts to run deficits at times of cyclical contraction may be 
viewed with suspicion and result in large jumps in risk premia (and thus borrowing 
costs), thus discouraging the use of countercyclical fiscal policy.
 26  Moreover, the scope 
for independent monetary policy can also be severely constrained by the impact of 
changes in monetary stance on the cost of public debt through the associated changes in 
the nominal exchange rate and interest rates.
  
 
ii. Improvement in fiscal balances has often been achieved either with stopgap measures 
unlikely to be sustainable, or in ways inimical to growth and welfare. 
  
But weaknesses in fiscal adjustment were not limited to the fact that increases in 
debt often offset improvements in primary surpluses.  In numerous instances, those 
improvements themselves were likely to be perceived as purely temporary -- either 
because the measures generating them were transparently transitory in nature, or because 
they directly compromised future growth and welfare.  In terms of the solvency constraint 
                                                                                                                                                 
hand, the dependence of spreads on lenders’ expectations raises the possibility of self-fulfilling debt crises 
(see e.g., Cohen and Portes, 2004). 
26 This is empirically confirmed by Calderón, Duncan and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003). 










































































































































































Source: JP Morgan.  23
above, such adjustments often did impact significantly on the current deficit but had little 
effect (or even an adverse one) on the path of future deficits.  
 
Such temporary fiscal correction was sometimes achieved by resorting to a 
variety of fiscal tricks designed to meet short-term deficit or debt targets without making 
any substantive progress toward fiscal solvency.  A common device involves changes in 
the timing of expenditures (e.g., postponing them into subsequent fiscal years or 
accumulating payments arrears) and/or revenues (e.g., speeding up the extraction of 
exhaustible resources or advancing tax collection) without altering their present value, 
which is the relevant magnitude for solvency.  Another popular strategy involves one-
time asset sales to finance the retirement of public debt, which in principle implies no 
change in the government’s net worth.  Likewise, governments have often resorted to 
replacing explicit debt with contingent liabilities (e.g., granting debt guarantees rather 
than subsidies to public firms).  All these measures share a common feature: they lead to 
improvements in conventional cash deficit and gross debt indicators -- the two fiscal 
benchmarks closely watched by investors and IFIs -- but have no effect on solvency.  In 
other words, they represent illusory fiscal adjustment.
 27 
 
In other instances, the appearance of fiscal adjustment may reflect a rise in 
revenues resulting from a temporary boom in tax bases -- for example, a consumption 
boom fueled by a transitory surge in capital inflows in an economy with a VAT-
dominated tax system.  When the boom comes to an abrupt end, a major fiscal gap opens 
in the recession.  There is evidence that this mechanism played a significant role in some 
emerging markets in the 1990s (Talvi, 1997). 
 
  More generally, in many fiscal-adjustment episodes the focus on the quantity of 
adjustment was not matched by a comparable emphasis on its quality. The attention given 
to public spending composition and to its implications for growth and welfare has often 
been very limited. This disinterest sometimes resulted in achieving adjustment at the cost 
of leaving critical social needs unmet, e.g., by giving inadequate protection to critical 
social expenditures (IMF 2003b, chapter 6).  
 
More often than not, productive public expenditures (on items such as human 
capital formation and infrastructure) have also been compressed in the process of fiscal 
adjustment.  The main reason is that the emphasis on cash deficits and debt discourages 
projects whose costs are borne upfront but whose returns accrue only over time.  Such 
projects have the same impact on the government’s short-term financing needs as pure 
consumption or any other spending item even though their impact on solvency is quite 
different because, unlike consumption, they involve creating assets that yield future 
revenues – be it directly, or in the form of augmented tax collection through higher 
output.  Conventional fiscal aggregates (such as the primary or the overall surplus) 
closely monitored by IFIs and investors ignore this distinction, and the result is that fiscal 
adjustment tends to have an anti-investment bias amply documented in both industrial 
                                                 
27 Easterly (1999) offers a variety of examples. These tricks are not exclusively used by developing 
countries. Many industrial countries have engaged in similar practices, particularly in the run-up to EMU. 
See also Easterly and Servén (2003).   24
and developing countries.
28  To the extent that reduced investment lowers growth and 
hence future tax bases, such bias can have adverse consequences for growth -- even for 
fiscal solvency itself.  The experience of Latin America, where declining public 
infrastructure spending accounted for the bulk of the fiscal correction achieved by some 
of the region’s major countries in the 1990s, provides a good example of this perverse 
dynamics. 
 
iii. In many countries, fiscal policy remains destabilizing 
  
As already noted, the stabilizing power of fiscal policy depends largely on its 
ability to mitigate cyclical fluctuations.  But in developing countries fiscal policy tends to 
behave in a pro-cyclical manner, expanding in booms and contracting in recessions, a 
pattern that makes it a major source of macroeconomic instability.  
 
Take for example the cyclical behavior of public consumption.  Empirical 
estimates show that, on average, a 1-percent increase in GDP growth tends to raise the 
growth rate of public consumption spending by around 0.5 percentage points in 
developing countries.  The corresponding figure for industrial countries is much smaller 
(around 0.15), and for the largest of them (the G-7 countries) the response of public 
consumption is actually negative.
29  Figure III.5 shows that, by this measure, fiscal 
procyclicality among developing countries peaked in the 1980s and declined somewhat 
over the 1990s -- but still remains much higher than in more advanced countries.  Indeed, 
procyclical fiscal policy played a key role in some of the major crises of recent years, 
Argentina being a prime example.
30 
 
                                                 
28 See Buiter (1990, chapter 5), Easterly and Servén (2003) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). A recent 
review of fiscal adjustment episodes (IMF 2003b) also concludes that in many cases the cuts in public 
investment were based on overoptimistic private investment forecasts and turned out to be excessive. 
29 These estimates are reported Talvi and Vegh (2000) and Lane (2003). They are broadly consistent with 
those displayed in the figure. Public consumption is used rather than the primary deficit because it is 
available for a much larger sample.  
30 The expansionary fiscal stance adopted by the Argentine authorities during the boom of 1995-97 forced 
them to engage in a self-destructive contraction in the downswing, helping precipitate the macroeconomic 
collapse of 2001-2002. See e.g., Mussa (2002) and Perry and Servén (2003).    25
 
 
iv. Lasting nominal stability remains to be credibly established   
 
The preceding points refer to two of the three components of the public-sector 
solvency condition: net debt B, and the present value of the primary surplus PV (T – G).   
The third component is the present value of seigniorage revenue PV(dM).  As shown in 
Section II, the 1990s witnessed substantial reductions in deficit monetization among 
developing countries.  But the sustainability of price stability in many of them remains to 
be established.  The key point is that, as the government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
indicates, the roots of inflation are ultimately fiscal.  Thus, while a transitory reduction in 
dM can be achieved in a variety of ways, unless durable increases in (T – G) are 
somehow institutionalized, continuing pressures on the government budget will result in 
debt accumulation that will in turn create pressures for monetization. 
 
Indeed, in many countries reductions in dM were not accompanied by lasting 
solutions to fiscal problems.  In some cases (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey) reduced inflation rates were achieved through exchange rate-based 
stabilizations.  While the improvements in price performance made reductions in money-
growth rates possible in these cases, the sustainability of this achievement was 
questionable in all of them.  Continued fiscal pressures were accompanied by real 
exchange-rate appreciations and increases in real interest rates in most of these cases, 
leading to a pileup of public debt and calling the sustainability of the stabilizations into 
question.  In the cases of Argentina and Ecuador, the inability to enforce fiscal discipline 
led to the adoption of “hard” exchange rate pegs (a currency board in Argentina and 
Figure III.5: Procyclicality of Public Consumption, 1980-2000
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Source: WDI-WB. 
Note: The table shows the median of country-specific coefficient estimates obtained regressing the rate of growth of public 
consumption on the rate of GDP (plus a constant).  26
dollarization in Ecuador) in the hope that they would somehow result in a hardening of 
government budget constraints too. Their failure to do so shows that such quick fixes do 
not suffice to achieve lasting nominal stability in the absence of an independent 
commitment to responsible fiscal policies.  In this way, in Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, 
exchange rate-based stabilizations relying on “soft” pegs eventually resulted in currency 
crises that gave way to short bursts of accelerated inflation.  Likewise, the devaluation of 
the CFA franc largely reflected the failure of the CFA arrangements to enforce fiscal 
discipline in the face of adverse terms of trade shocks. 
 
In the search for nominal stability, some countries adopted in the 1990s an 
alternative institutional arrangement, which relies on an independent domestic central 
bank with a commitment to price stability.  Like a fixed nominal exchange rate, such an 
arrangement works in principle by committing the central bank to a low value of dM, 
thereby imposing a hard budget constraint on the fiscal authorities and forcing the latter 
to adjust (T – G) to the requirements of price stability.  But for such an arrangement to be 
effective in promoting lasting price stability, the central bank has not only to be 
committed to price stability, but also to be able to effectively resist pressures for 
monetization arising from the fiscal side -- i.e., it has to avoid fiscal dominance and 
achieve true independence from the finance ministry.    
 
How did central bank independence fare among developing countries in the 
1990s?  Some observers have noted that a good indicator of de facto (as opposed to de 
jure) central bank independence is the frequency of turnover of the central bank 
governor.
31  Figure III.6 provides data on such turnover among developing countries 
during the 1990s, showing a sharp decrease among middle-income countries relative to 
the decade of the eighties, and a more modest one among low-income developing 
countries.   
 
                                                 
31 Most empirical studies conclude that legal central bank independence is not significantly associated with 
lower inflation across developing countries (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992; Campillo and Miron, 
1997). The likely reason is that there are substantial deviations between the letter of the law and its 
application. As an exception, however, Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2001) find a significant negative 
effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in transition economies with a sufficiently high 
degree of economic liberalization. A recent study by Gutiérrez (2003) suggests that constitutional sanction 
of the independence of the central bank, as well as a clear primacy of inflation among its stated objectives, 
may provide a better measure of its anti-inflationary effectiveness.   27
 
 
However, the rate of turnover of the central bank governor may be a very poor 
indicator of the expected permanence of nominal stability.
32  Thus, it may be useful to try 
to infer the private sector’s expectations regarding nominal stability in other ways, at 
least indirectly, by observing its behavior.  One indicator of the confidence that private 
agents in developing countries may have in the permanence of nominal stability is the 
incidence of dollarization.  Since agents can partly protect themselves against nominal 
instability by denominating their assets in foreign exchange, improved confidence in 
nominal stability should result in a reduced incidence of dollarization.
33  However, many 
developing countries remained heavily dollarized by the end of the 1990s and, as Figure 
III.7 shows, the median degree of dollarization of bank deposits among low and middle-
income developing countries actually rose over the 1990s.
34  The contrast with richer 
                                                 
32 Long-serving central bank governors may be subservient to finance ministers who place a high premium 
on the financing of fiscal deficits, and even independent central bank governors need not be firmly 
committed to price stability.  Indeed, the cross-country empirical association between central bank 
governor turnover and inflation performance is not robust: the relation is negative only when a few high-
inflation observations are included in the samples; see de Haan and Koi (2000). This might reflect reverse 
causality from high inflation to turnover rather than the other way around.  
33 However, perceptions of nominal instability are not the only factor behind financial dollarization.  The 
degree of real dollarization and the perceived stability of the real exchange rate also matter, as do financial 
system regulations and the availability of other assets sheltering investors from nominal instability (such as 
instruments indexed to domestic inflation, as in Chile, or short-term interest rates, as in Brazil). For 
discussion, see de la Torre and Schmukler (2003), Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) and IMF (2002a).   Thus the 
interpretation in the text should be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive.  








MIDDLE (41) LOW (22)
Figure III.6: Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries
(governor turnover, medians by country income group)
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Source: Sturm and de Haan (2001).  28
countries is stark -- their much lower degree of deposit dollarization showed little change 




Ex-post real interest rates may provide another indirect source of information: 
they tend to be high when actual inflation falls short of expectations, or also when 
inflation uncertainty is high.  Figure III.8 plots ex-post real interest rates during the 1990s 
in industrial and developing countries.  Though real interest rates in industrial countries 
were on a declining trend during the 1990s, this was not the case in developing countries.  
Among the latter, real interest rates remained persistently high and were higher at the end 
of the decade than at the beginning.
35 
 
                                                 
35 The real interest rate is measured as the (log) difference between the nominal interest rate and the one-









Figure III.7: Deposit Dollarization, 1996 and 2001
(foreign currency deposits as percent of total, medians by country income group)
HIGH (18) MIDDLE (43) LOW  (31)
Source: IMF-IFS. 
Note: For Austria, Haiti, Israel, Mexico, Macedonia, and Netherlands we take the 1997 data, and for Ghana, Italy, Norway, 
Tajikistan, and Uganda we take the 2000 data. High corresponds to OECD and non OECD countries.  29
 
 
Of course, both dollarization ratios and ex-post real interest rates reflect a variety 
of factors in addition to perceptions of nominal instability, so this evidence is only 
suggestive.
36  But other indicators point in the same direction.  As an extreme example, 
the currency premium on the Argentine peso was positive throughout the 1990s, and its 
magnitude became very large at times of turbulence, in spite of the supposedly 
irrevocable peg to the dollar enshrined in Argentina’s Convertibility Law.
37  
 
v. The transition to robust exchange rate arrangements has been anything but smooth 
 
Progress toward robust exchange rate regimes occurred at an uneven pace. 
Indeed, it probably was an early casualty of the search for macroeconomic stability.  As 
already discussed, many countries adopted exchange rate-based stabilization strategies as 
a supposedly quick recipe for disinflation.  These not only meant the adoption of single-
currency pegs, but also made such pegs very difficult to adjust, since the credibility of the 
entire stabilization program was tied up with the stability of the peg.  In effect, the 
defense of the peg sometimes became an end in itself, even when it was evident that it 
had outlived its usefulness.  More flexible exchange rate arrangements -- i.e., 
arrangements lacking a pre-announced peg, with or without extensive central bank 
intervention, have too often been adopted only in the aftermath of currency crises. 
                                                 
36 For example, the upward drift in interest rates likely reflects also the liberalization of financial systems in 
many developing countries over the 1990s.    
37 Schmukler and Servén (2002). 
Figure III.8: Real Interest Rates, 1990-2001
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Sources: IMF-IFS and WDI-WB.
Note: The real interest rate is measured as the (log) difference between the nominal interest rate and the one-period-ahead
rate of GDP inflation.   30
The Mexico and East Asia crises, which involved the collapse of a variety of soft 
pegs, prompted what came to be known as the “two extremes” view of exchange-rate 
regimes, according to which only irrevocable pegs (including both currency boards and 
monetary unification or dollarization) and freely floating exchange rates were fit for 
survival in a world of increasing financial integration.  There appeared to be an incipient 
flight away from intermediate regimes,
38 based on the belief that the institutional 
foundation of monetary stability had to involve either arrangements taking discretion 
over money growth rates out of the hands of central banks, or the establishment of fully 
independent central banks with reputational stakes in low and stable inflation as well as 
the means (legal authority, policy instruments, human-resource capability) to achieve that 
goal.  One explanation that was offered for this trend was that only these extreme regimes 




In reality, the late 1990s showed that neither dollarization nor currency boards 
offered a speedy shortcut to fiscal orthodoxy and nominal stability – instead of the slow 
and painful buildup of credibility required for an independent monetary policy – that their 
proponents had hoped.  In particular, the Argentine episode brought into the open the 
threat to stability posed by inflexible exchange rates, which made adjustment to real 
disturbances exceedingly difficult. These shackles eventually undermine the 
sustainability of such rigid arrangements. Though less well known, the fate of the CFA 
franc during the first half of the 1990s provided another example (see Box III.1).  But the 
establishment of a truly independent and effective central bank has not been a 
straightforward matter either.  The creation of independent central banks in Venezuela in 
1989 and in Mexico in 1993, for example, did not prevent the emergence of substantial 
political pressures for credit creation that contributed to currency crises in both of those 
countries in the first half of the 1990s.
40 
 
vi. The reform agenda proved to be incomplete 
 
The preceding observations suggest that, as far as the traditional instruments of 
macroeconomic policy are concerned, the implementation of the reform agenda of the 
1990s left much to be desired.  But the agenda was also deficient in its very design.  In 
particular, the experience of the 1990s showed reform to have been incomplete, in the 
sense that it left in place -- or worse yet, created -- important sources of macroeconomic 
fragility. 
 
 A particular area of fragility in which the policy-based stability agenda was 
incomplete is that of financial-sector soundness.  While research has shown that an 
efficient domestic financial system is important for growth, the experience of the 1990s 
                                                 
38 The flight out of intermediate regimes was documented, for example, by Fischer (2001). Whether it was 
in fact taking place has been disputed, however, particularly because alternative exchange regime 
classifications tend to provide sharply conflicting verdicts on regime trends. See Masson (2001) and 
Frenkel and Wei (2004) for further discussion.  
39 See Frankel et al (2001). 
40 Similar pressures were successfully applied on the supposedly independent Argentine central bank in 
2001 on the eve of the collapse of the hard peg.   31
strongly suggests that a sound one is indispensable for macroeconomic stability.  The 
reform agenda of the early 1990s was incomplete in the sense that the central role of the 
financial system for macro stability was often ignored -- even though it should have been 
clear in light of the Southern Cone crises of the early 1980s.  Thus to the standard policy-
oriented prescriptions for stability -- a solvent fiscal stance, low and stable money growth 
and robust exchange rate policies that nevertheless allow adjustment to shocks -- it is 
necessary to add the adoption of policies to foster a sound financial system.
41   
 
Aside from the shortcomings of macro policy stability in the traditional sense, 
stability in this particular sense -- i.e., that of assuring a sound domestic financial system 
-- was clearly not widely achieved.  As a result, an important source of macroeconomic 
fragility was not only left in place but may, indeed, have even been magnified in the 
1990s, for reasons to be explained below.  Inadequate attention to financial sector 
soundness often resulted in a domestic economic environment in which institutional 
problems involving moral hazard were rife, rendering both public as well as private 
balance sheets highly vulnerable to changes in the environment (interest-rate and 
exchange-rate changes) and posing a major obstacle to outcomes-based stability in a 
number of major countries.
42  The proliferation of financial crises in the 1990s reflects in 
part this missing piece of the reform agenda.  Indeed, the incidence of systemic banking 
crises was even higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s, particularly in the second half of 
the decade (Figure III.9).
43  
 
                                                 
41 Indeed, in the wake of the crises of the 1990s the IMF has redefined its “core competencies” to include 
fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and financial sector policies. 
42 Ironically, under these circumstances incipient progress along conventional dimensions of macro stability 
such as disinflation may even have made financial crises more likely -- e.g., the use of the exchange rate as 
a nominal anchor may have encouraged agents to ignore exchange rate risk and in the case of  “hard” pegs 
such as that of Argentina may have made it more difficult for regulators to induce financial institutions to 
factor such risk into their portfolio allocations without raising fears of a possible abandonment of the peg. 
43 The increasing incidence of banking crises is also documented by Bordo et al (2001).   32
 
 
But the frequency and severity of crises was also affected by an important change 
in the economic environment, namely increased capital mobility.  This added another key 
source of fragility, by making economies vulnerable to sudden shifts in capital flows -- 
such as those documented in section II. In fact, the combination of unsound policies in 
the financial sector and open capital accounts helps explain many characteristics of the 
crises of the 1990s.  First, many of these crises were twin crises, simultaneously 
involving currency and banking collapses, often characterized by banking problems 
preceding a currency crash, which then fed back into a full-blown financial crisis.
44  
Second, many of these crises proved hard to predict on the basis of standard 
macroeconomic imbalances.  Those that were hardest to predict -- especially the Mexican 
and Asian crises -- occurred in a setting where the main vulnerabilities concerned 
financial, rather than macroeconomic, variables and took the form of balance-of-
payments runs similar to traditional bank runs.
45 Third, many of these crises were 
surprisingly severe.  The deepest crises involved serious problems in the financial sector 
(Mexico, Asia, Ecuador and Turkey), in private sector balance sheets (Asia, Argentina), 
or fiscal insolvency (Ecuador, Argentina).  Where none of these problems were present 
                                                 
44 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
45 In accordance with this, the recent analytical literature on crises continues to stress weak fundamentals as 
a prerequisite for the occurrence of crises, but emphasizes the key role of ingredients such as self-fulfilling 
expectations and multiple equilibria in triggering them; see e.g., Chari and Kehoe (2003) for a recent 
example. These views assign an increasingly important role to financial system imperfections in full-blown 
balance of payments crises; see for example Krugman (1999).  
Figure III.9: Incidence of Systemic Banking Crises, Developing Countries, 1981-2000













































































































LDC (60) MIDDLE (35) LOW (24)
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).  33
and events took the form of a simple currency crash (as in Brazil), crisis-induced 
economic contraction was not as severe.
46   
  
III.3 The Growth Payoff 
 
While the improvements in macroeconomic policies were limited -- as the 
preceding discussion has shown -- growth rates have indeed risen relative to the 1980s in 
many developing countries. The achievement is only a modest one, however, since 
growth in the 1980s was generally low, and for a majority of countries, growth rates in 
the 1990s remained well below those of the 1960s and 1970s.
47 
 
Is this growth payoff commensurate with the progress made with macroeconomic 
stability, or is it “disappointing”? It is important to keep in mind that industrial countries 
also grew much faster in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1990s (Pritchett, 2004a). In 
addition, several issues need to be taken into account.  First, as already explained, the 
growth payoff from macro stability depends on its perceived permanence. But, as just 
discussed, in many instances progress on the macro stability front was based on policy 
changes that were not perceived to be durable, and/or failed to include the reform of the 
institutions underlying macroeconomic policy-making.  In this sense, the growth payoff 
that should have been expected from the type of stability that was actually achieved may 
have been overstated.  Moreover, a vicious circle may have taken hold in some countries, 
in that the social consensus that made the policies possible -- and that is necessary to 
make them sustainable -- has faltered in the absence of a fairly prompt growth payoff.  
 
Second, the search for macro stability -- narrowly defined -- may in some cases 
have actually been inimical to growth.  As already noted, a preoccupation with reducing 
inflation induced some countries to adopt exchange-rate regimes that ultimately 
conflicted with outcomes-based stability.  In other cases, as shown previously, a single-
minded pursuit of macro stability may have come at the expense of growth-enhancing 
policies (e.g., an adequate provision of public goods), as well as of social investments 
that might have both increased the growth payoff and made stability more durable.   
 
From this perspective, some economies may well have been over-stabilized, in 
both microeconomic and macroeconomic senses.  From a microeconomic perspective, the 
presumed stability gains from further fiscal adjustments may not have justified the costs 
of foregoing key social and productive expenditures. From a macroeconomic perspective 
the narrow focus on stability may have precluded more progress toward countercyclical 
policies.  The contrast between the significant fiscal adjustment achieved by most 
developing countries and the persistence of outcomes-based instability suggests that this 
factor may have been important. 
                                                 
46 The Russian crisis also turned out not to be very severe, but probably for exogenous reasons (i.e., the 
sharp recovery in world oil prices).  More generally, there is evidence that twin crises are usually much 
more costly in terms of output than standard banking-only or currency-only crises; see Bordo et al (2001). 
47 Of course, in the short run the objectives of macro stability and growth may conflict with each other, as 
stabilization measures often entail an output cost over the near term. But the growth disappointment refers 
to the performance over the entire decade of the 1990s.   34
 
Third, aside from whether the search for macro stability worked at cross-purposes 
with that for higher growth, the incompleteness of the macro reform agenda prevented the 
reduction in macroeconomic fragility that would have been required to fully translate 
policy-based stability into outcomes-based stability.  Although overall macroeconomic 
volatility decreased among developing countries, extreme volatility actually rose during 
the 1990s, largely a reflection of a spate of crises during the decade.  Moreover, the 
adverse impacts of extreme volatility on growth appear to exceed those of normal 
volatility.
48  Thus, the growth payoff of the macroeconomic policy improvements 
achieved in the nineties was limited not only by their weak institutional underpinnings, 
but also by the extreme outcomes-based instability that emerged during the decade 
mainly as a result of the fragilities overlooked by an incomplete reform agenda. 
 
Last, but not least, as argued in Section III.1, while macroeconomic stability may 
facilitate growth when other forces are driving the growth momentum, it is not enough to 
drive the growth process itself.  That role has more to do with the various policies and 
institutions that shape the opportunities and incentives to engage in growth-enhancing 
activities (as discussed in Pritchett, 2004b).  The importance of these complementary 
factors may not have been sufficiently appreciated early in the decade.   
 
In sum, there is little reason to expect a simple, direct association between macro 
stability and growth, even if stability as measured by commonly used macro policy 
indicators is achieved.  From this perspective, the limited growth payoff that emerged 





  An important lesson from the 1990s is that the old verities concerning the 
importance of macroeconomic stability still hold true.  While macroeconomic policy 
realizations are not all that matters for promoting economic growth, they clearly do 
matter.  Perceived fiscal insolvency, high and unstable inflation and severely overvalued 
real exchange rates remain reliable recipes for extreme instability and slow growth.  
Despite the rather dramatic improvements in fiscal performance by large groups of 
developing countries, fiscal insolvency continued to produce 1980s-style crises in 
                                                 
48 There are good reasons why crisis volatility  (i.e., that due to large adverse shocks) should entail greater 
growth costs than normal volatility.  On the one hand, with a given set of risk-management mechanisms, 
large shocks may be more difficult to absorb than small ones.  These threshold effects of volatility have 
been found to be empirically relevant for investment (Sarkar, 2000; Servén, 2003).  On the other hand, due 
to asymmetries built into the economy negative shocks have qualitatively different consequences than 
positive ones.  A clear example is that of buffer stocks -- e.g., bank liquidity or international reserves: large 
adverse shocks (or a succession of small negative ones) can exhaust them and trigger an adjustment 
mechanism very different from the one involved for positive disturbances.  The same applies to firms’ net 
worth -- once it becomes negative, adjustment proceeds through bankruptcies, with the corresponding 
destruction of productive assets.  Empirically, there is evidence that crisis-type volatility is significantly 
more adverse for growth than normal volatility (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2004). 
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countries as diverse as Argentina, Ecuador and Russia.  In other countries, such as 
Pakistan, continued fiscal difficulties resulted in uncertainties that depressed investment 
and resulted in a prolonged period of slow growth.  High inflation contributed to 
continuing macroeconomic instability in Ecuador, Turkey and Venezuela.  Overvalued 
real exchange rates slowed growth and/or contributed to crises in Asia, Argentina, 
Mexico and Russia.  In short, the experience of the 1990s has confirmed what we thought 
was clear at the end of the 1980s: macroeconomic policies matter for growth. 
 
But as the discussion in the preceding pages has argued, the evidence of the 1990s 
also shows that macroeconomic policy realizations are not all that matter. Three other 
ingredients are critical: the institutional framework for monetary and fiscal policy, the 
prevention of macroeconomic fragilities and complementary pro-growth reforms.  These 
elements are reviewed briefly below. 
   
IV.1 Institutions for Macroeconomic Policy Formulation 
 
The institutional context in which traditional macroeconomic policies are 
formulated is critical to achieving an adequate resolution of the tradeoff between policy 
credibility and flexibility.  Both ingredients are required for the durable outcomes-based 
stability that ultimately matters for economic growth.  In the fiscal area, an appropriate 
institutional setting should ensure transparency, sustainable solvency -- possibly through 
the adoption of fiscal rules -- flexibility and a pro-growth structure of government 
budgets. With respect to the monetary and exchange-rate policies within the purview of 
the central bank, the most successful institutional innovation to emerge in the 1990s 
seems to be one featuring an independent central bank with a floating exchange-rate 
regime and a publicly announced inflation target.  The rest of this subsection examines 
more closely these aspects of the institutional framework for the formulation of 
traditional macroeconomic policies. 
 
a. Fiscal Policy  
 
 - Budgetary institutions and countercyclical fiscal policies 
 
The critical problem of shaping fiscal policy to be procyclical has not gone away 
during the 1990s.  The phenomenon arises because, in the absence of strong budgetary 
institutions, a “tragedy of the commons” sets in during good times when government 
revenues are high -- no claimant on the government’s budgetary resources internalizes the 
needs of fiscal solvency, and political imperatives thus cause the government to spend all 
of its resources (even to borrow) in the boom, leaving little margin of solvency to draw 
upon in order to finance fiscal deficits when times are bad.  
 
What is required in such situations is to make it politically possible for the 
government to run fiscal surpluses during good times through the development of 
budgetary institutions and/or the implementation of fiscal rules that force the claimants to 
the government’s resources to respect the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, 
thus securing prudent fiscal responses to favorable shocks.    36
 
Transparent fiscal rules embodied in the country’s constitution or passed into law 
subject to change only by legislative supermajorities, with stipulated penalties for 
noncompliance, may be effective in many contexts.
49  In countries where government 
revenues are heavily dependent on the prices of primary commodities, for example, 
institutions such as oil stabilization funds may need to be created to save windfalls.  More 
generally, the key objective is to provide scope for automatic fiscal stabilizers to do their 
job.  One promising example is Chile’s Structural Surplus rule, which establishes fiscal 
policy targets adjusted for the variation in growth over the cycle.  
 
Alternative proposals have focused on the creation of an independent “fiscal 
policy council.” modeled along lines similar to an independent central bank, to set annual 
deficit limits.  While this approach seems a logical implication of the international 
evidence that centralized fiscal authority helps resolve the commons problem, it has yet 
to be implemented.
50  Whatever institutional arrangement is chosen, a basic policy step is 
to set fiscal deficit targets in cyclically-adjusted terms, a practice that could be 
encouraged by the IFIs. 
 
Similar arguments apply to fiscal decentralization.  While the local provision of 
public goods has much to recommend it, experience has shown that fiscal 
decentralization is also vulnerable to a commons problem unless institutional remedies 
are implemented that have the effect of imposing hard budget constraints on sub national 
governments. One way of reducing the procyclical bias in decentralized systems is to 
insulate resource-sharing arrangements from the effects of the cycle.
51  
 
Another important institutional aspect of fiscal policy is that of transparency. 
Uncertainty about the state of the fiscal accounts probably played a large role in 
generating the volatility of the risk premia that developing-country borrowers faced in 
international capital markets during the 1990s.  Enhanced fiscal transparency is an 
important step in reducing such uncertainty.  There is also evidence that more transparent 
budgetary procedures are associated with lower deficits and debt.
52  The interests of fiscal 
transparency are well served by full accounting of the contingent liabilities of the public 
sector, including those of the central bank, and by explicit recognition of implicit 
liabilities – including those embedded in public pension systems.  
 
- Fiscal flexibility 
 
But another lesson of the nineties is that fiscal flexibility is as important as fiscal 
credibility.   In the end, a credibly stable policy framework is not an end in itself.  
Instead, it matters for instrumental reasons; it makes it more feasible to achieve stability 
                                                 
49 See Perry (2003).  
50 See Wyplosz (2002) for more details on the fiscal policy council proposal.  
51 See Sanguinetti and Tommassi (2003) for an analytical appraisal of alternative institutional setups.  Burki 
et al (1999) review the international experience with various institutional arrangements in fiscally 
decentralized systems.  
52 See Stein et al (1998) and Alt and Lassen (2003).   37
of macroeconomic outcomes in a world in which destabilizing shocks are unavoidable.  
Stability in a policy sense is useful for its own sake only insofar as it avoids introducing 
self-inflicted types of shocks to aggravate an already unstable environment.  But the 
value of policy stability is reduced if the credibility gains that such stability offers are not 
exploited in occasional departures from the medium-term stance of policies made 
necessary to counteract exogenous sources of instability.  
 
This observation applies also to fiscal rules and similar arrangements discussed 
above.  To be effective, they need to balance the objectives of credibility and flexibility. 
Simpler rules are more transparent and hence more easily verifiable.  But at the same 
time they need to allow sufficient flexibility for fiscal policy to react to a changing 
economic environment.  Indeed, overly rigid rules are unlikely to be sustainable or 
credible -- as shown by the increasing difficulties into which the European Stability Pact 
has run due to its neglect of the role of the macroeconomic cycle. 
 
One lesson of the 1990s, however, is that it is difficult for governments to depart 
from the path of fiscal rectitude even when outcomes-based stability would make it 
desirable for this to happen, out of fear that markets may interpret this as a sign of fiscal 
lassitude.  The tight fiscal policy adopted by the countries most heavily affected by the 
Asian financial crisis in the immediate aftermath of the crisis -- even while in the grip of 
severe recessions – is an example of this problem.
53 
 
Of course, it is hard to determine the extent to which those fears were well 
founded. To the extent that they were -- and that markets would indeed have reacted 
adversely -- the importance of the previous lesson on the implementation of improved 
fiscal institutions is enhanced, since the role of such institutions is precisely that of 
attaining the credibility required for governments to exercise fiscal flexibility without 
being unjustifiably punished by financial markets.  If threats to confidence were 
overstated, however, then a key moral of the experience of the nineties is that it is 
important not to make a fetish out of fiscal stability as such.  The need is only for as 
much stability as is required to convince the private sector that there has been a 
sustainable regime change.  Once this is accomplished, the scope provided by gains in 
credibility to use macroeconomic policy instruments flexibly for stabilization purposes 
should be exploited to achieve outcomes-based stability.   
 
- Sustainable fiscal solvency and the avoidance of fiscal stopgaps 
 
An important lesson of the nineties is that the composition of fiscal adjustment 
matters both on the expenditure and revenue sides of the government’s budget.  In 
particular, a fiscal adjustment that is perceived to be durable must be based on sustainable 
policies on both sides of the budget, and on both sides of the budget it should be based on 
measures that are likely to enhance growth rather than retard it.   
                                                 
53 A recent study by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Unit (IMF 2003c) suggests that the problem is more 
widespread.  The study finds, in particular, that in “capital account crisis” cases, what appear in retrospect 
to have been cyclically-appropriate fiscal expansions were not undertaken in part out of fear of adverse 
effects on market confidence.   38
 
With respect to sustainability, the key is that fiscal adjustments should be based 
on measures that the private sector can expect to increase the present value of future 
primary surpluses.  Fiscal stopgaps of a temporary nature fall short of this criterion.  
Fiscal credibility cannot be achieved through policies that improve the government’s 
budget outcomes for a year or two while leaving longstanding underlying fiscal problems 
unresolved.   
 
On the other hand, some measures such as highly distortionary taxes (e.g., on 
external trade or on domestic financial transactions) or cuts in spending on productive 
infrastructure or human capital may raise the present value of the primary surplus at the 
expense of reduced growth.
54  Indeed, reduced spending on health and education may 
have adverse effects on growth not just by reducing the accumulation of human capital, 
but also by undermining political support for sustaining responsible macroeconomic 
policies.  Such measures defeat the ultimate objective of fiscal adjustment – namely, to 
allow the resumption of sustained growth.
55  
 
b. Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
While the evidence suggests that low and stable rates of inflation are conducive to 
economic growth, theory suggests that what is most important is for the private sector to 
be convinced that low and stable inflation is here to stay.  Evidence in the previous 
section indicated that maintaining this perception proved to be an elusive goal in the 
1990s.  As in the case of fiscal credibility, what is required is an appropriate institutional 
underpinning for price stability.  However, one lesson of the 1990s is that the design of 
purely monetary arrangements cannot assure monetary policy credibility.  Fiscal 
credibility is a necessary condition for monetary credibility, and not even the most rigid 
monetary arrangements (a currency board or de jure dollarization) provide a guarantee of 
hard government budget constraints. On the other hand, a credible commitment to fiscal 
solvency is not the same thing as a credible commitment to price stability, since fiscal 
solvency is in principle compatible with relatively high and fluctuating levels of 
seigniorage revenue.  Thus there is a separate role for monetary institutions that can 
credibly preclude excessive reliance on seigniorage revenues.   
 
                                                 
54 These policies may fail to raise the present value of future primary surpluses if their negative effects on 
economic growth have a sufficiently adverse impact on growth in government revenues; see Easterly and 
Servén (2003). 
55 Perhaps the most dramatic example of this problem is the failure of the South African government to 
address the country’s alarming rate of HIV infection more aggressively, an outcome that some critics have 
blamed on fears of budgetary costs.  This situation may not only have undermined the country’s long-term 
growth through a variety of possible channels, but has also weakened support for the government’s pursuit 
of macroeconomic stability.  Similarly, timidity on the part of Latin American countries in addressing 
poverty problems on the continent, partly driven by fiscal stringency, has contributed to the failure of 
income distribution to improve in the region during the 1990s.  This outcome has combined with the 
region’s disappointing growth performance to weaken support in Latin America for the reform agenda of 
the past decade. 
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The 1990s have shown that there are no institutional shortcuts to monetary 
credibility.  It has to be earned the hard way: through anti-inflationary performance.  In 
this regard, the institution of an independent central bank operating a floating exchange 
rate -- and with a commitment to price stability that takes the form of a publicly-
announced inflation target -- appears to have been a successful innovation among 
emerging-market economies during the past decade.  Such arrangements are currently 
maintained by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Thailand. 
This institutional arrangement has the important advantages of flexibility (since the 
central bank is not constrained in how it attains its inflation target) as well as of 
commitment (since the central bank’s prestige is publicly put on the line).  Most 
importantly, the adoption of floating exchange rates and inflation targets allows the 
domestic authorities to establish their anti-inflationary credibility the hard way -- i.e., by 
establishing a track record – rather than by attempting to import it through some form of 
exchange-rate peg.  The longest-running of these arrangements -- in Chile -- has been 
remarkably successful in maintaining price stability throughout the decade of the nineties, 
while avoiding severe episodes of real exchange-rate volatility.  More recent converts to 
this type of nominal institutional arrangement have also been quite successful since its 
(admittedly recent) adoption.  
 
IV.2 Robustness: The Scope of the Macroeconomic Reform Agenda 
 
Overall, an important lesson from the experience of the 1990s is that the quality 
of traditional macro policy-based stability matters.  A particularly important corollary is 
that an appropriate institutional setting for formulation of fiscal, monetary and exchange 
rate policies is indispensable.  But beyond these traditional macroeconomic policies, the 
proliferation of crises during the 1990s has made it clear that policy also needs to attend 
to robustness issues.  That is, the stability agenda should encompass not just fiscal, 
monetary, and exchange rate policies, but also policies designed to reduce 
macroeconomic (especially financial) fragility. This includes, in particular, policies 
directed toward the domestic financial system and toward the management of the 
country’s capital account, both of which have been shown to have important implications 
for macroeconomic fragility and thus for outcomes-based macroeconomic stability.   
 
a. The Domestic Financial Sector 
 
Concerning the policy regime governing the domestic financial sector, the 
experience of the last decade has once again underlined the importance of an 
appropriately regulated and supervised domestic financial system to avoid 
macroeconomic vulnerability arising from the concentration of lending in highly risky 
activities or the emergence of balance sheet mismatches.   
 
While the repressed domestic financial sectors that prevailed in many developing 
countries during previous decades (as documented in Ramachandran, 2004) were 
undoubtedly inimical to economic growth, an important old lesson that was re-learned 
over the past decade is that reforming the domestic financial sector is not synonymous 
with liberalizing it.   In particular, removing restrictions on entry, on the setting of   40
interest rates and on the allocation of the portfolios of financial institutions without at the 
same time strengthening the institutional framework in which the financial sector 
operates creates excessive scope for moral-hazard lending, resulting in financial-sector 
balance sheets that are fragile and vulnerable to insolvency in response even to moderate 
macroeconomic shocks.   
 
As has been widely recognized, the appropriate institutional framework involves 
clear and secure property rights, an accessible, efficient and impartial legal system to 
enforce contracts, appropriate legal protection for creditors, well-specified accounting 
and disclosure standards, a regulatory system that screens entrants while encouraging 
competition, imposing adequate capital requirements and preventing excessively risky 
lending and a supervisory system that can effectively monitor the lending practices of 
domestic financial institutions.   The key lesson is that the pace of liberalization for 
domestic financial systems that have not already been liberalized should be modulated to 
reflect the quality of the institutional framework governing the domestic financial sector 
and that improving the quality of this framework deserves high priority in the 
macroeconomic reform agenda.   
 
b. The Capital Account 
 
With respect to the capital account, the management of a county’s integration into 
international financial markets remains a controversial part of the institutional agenda.   
As is true in the case of the domestic financial sector, enhanced integration with world 
financial markets promises many benefits, but the costs -- in the form of macro risks -- 
may outweigh those benefits when the domestic institutional structure is defective. 
Increased financial openness makes it easier for investors to inflict swift and severe 
punishment on countries in response to perceptions, warranted or not, that their 
macroeconomic policies are off-track.  However, countries’ misguided attempts to ride 
the wave of short-term capital have also played a major role in some crisis episodes.
56  
 
Indeed, despite the theoretical arguments concerning the gains from capital 
account openness, the empirical evidence on whether it has in fact been conducive to 
growth in the international experience is inconclusive.
57  Moreover, the evidence suggests 




                                                 
56 In the words of Larry Summers, referring to the role of Mexico’s Tesobonos on the eve of the Tequila 
crisis:  “[…] the situation was not one of an innocent country somehow overwhelmed by a flood of capital 
from the herd of speculators, but rather a situation of countries who, for domestic policy reasons, made 
very, very active efforts to dine with the devil of speculators -- and ended on the menu” (Speaking from 
Experience, lecture delivered in Washington DC on February 2, 2004). Electronic link: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bspan/PresentationView.asp?PID=1015&EID=328 
57 The most comprehensive empirical study is that of Edison et al (2002), who fail to find robust evidence 
of a significant growth impact.  Prasad et al (2003) argue that there may be “threshold effects”: countries 
with sound policies and institutions are more likely to derive a growth benefit from financial integration. 
58 See Kose et al (2003).   41
  The desire to avoid macroeconomic fragility makes a strong case for institutional 
arrangements regarding the capital account that at least prevent the emergence of 
maturity mismatches in a country’s external balance sheet, since such mismatches can 
make the country vulnerable to creditor runs analogous to bank runs.
59  The question is 
how to preclude them.  A difficulty in achieving this objective is that short maturities are 
attractive to creditors as a means of monitoring borrowers and controlling their behavior 
precisely when asymmetric information and moral hazard problems are serious.  Under 
these circumstances, therefore, short-maturity borrowing will arise endogenously because 
it will be substantially less costly to borrowers than long-term loans.  The problem is, of 
course, that voluntary short-maturity loans between private parties fail to take into 
account the social costs associated with the risk of creditor runs. 
 
One possible way to deal with maturity mismatches is for the public sector to 
accumulate large stocks of foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange reserves) to offset 
liquid liabilities incurred by the private sector.  While this approach is at present being 
pursued by some East Asian countries, as well as Chile, it is likely to be very expensive. 
Holding large volumes of low-yielding, short-term assets instead of (illiquid) long-term 
investment entails serious opportunity costs and even fiscal ones, as the purchase of 
foreign exchange reserves needs to be sterilized by the sale of typically higher-yielding 
domestic government liabilities.  In this case, the incentives that give rise to short-term 
borrowing are left in place, and the costs of insuring against creditor runs are ultimately 
borne by taxpayers. 
 
An alternative route is to discourage the private sector from incurring short-term 
external liabilities in the first place through restrictions on short-term capital inflows, or 
to make those liabilities effectively less liquid in times of crisis through restrictions on 
short-term capital outflows.  Because both of these policies would tend to increase the 
cost of short-term loans, they effectively operate by internalizing the systemic costs 
associated with the risk of creditor runs.   The questions are, of course, whether such 
restrictions can be designed to be minimally distortionary with respect to other types of 
capital flows and whether they can be made effective.   
 
These questions have attracted considerable attention in recent years.  In the case 
of restrictions on inflows, the empirical evidence is modestly reassuring.  Cross-country 
and country-specific studies generally conclude that inflow restrictions such as 
unremunerated reserve requirements (e.g., the Chilean encaje) tend to have no significant 
effect on the overall volume of inflows but do affect their composition, reducing the 
share of short-term flows in the total.
60  In contrast, evidence on the effects of restrictions 
on outflows is much less conclusive. 
 
                                                 
59 These runs played a key role in the East Asian crisis; see for example Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
Mismatches may reflect not only an inadequate borrowing strategy, but also the reluctance of investors to 
lend long-term in the face of a macro-financial framework deemed suspect. 
60  The reason is that a uniform reserve requirement is more onerous for short-term transactions than for the 
rest.  Montiel and Reinhart (1999) review the cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of inflow 
restrictions.    42
The available evidence, then, suggests that restrictions on short-term capital 
inflows may have a role to play in the achievement of outcomes-based macroeconomic 
stability in developing countries.  However, it is important to be aware of the fact that 
such restrictions do entail economically significant costs to private agents, in terms of 
their impact on the availability and/or price of financing.
61  
 
In addition to maturity mismatches, external borrowing also aggravates the 
problem of currency mismatches, to the extent that foreign lenders are less willing to 
accept the risk of currency depreciation than are domestic lenders and thus refuse to 
extend credit in the borrowers’ currency.  The solution, however, is not to restrict access 
to external borrowing.  As in the case of dollarization, in the short run the key is to 
promote the efficient distribution of this exchange-rate risk within the domestic economy 
by ensuring -- through regulatory means -- that it is appropriately priced and therefore 
borne by those best able to bear it (typically agents holding foreign currency assets -- 
including exporters -- or those with a high degree of risk tolerance).  In the case of 
sovereign borrowing, the priority is to ensure that borrowing decisions do recognize the 
existence and potential cost of exchange rate risk.  
 
In the longer term, a larger role in ameliorating the problem of currency 
mismatches would be assumed by institutional changes that promote credible nominal 
stability, thus mitigating exchange-rate risk.  The experience of emerging economies that 
are starting to be able to denominate external borrowing in domestic currency -- such as 
South Africa -- is consistent with this perspective.  IFIs could help advance this process 
by denominating their lending in local currency, a practice that is already starting with 
some emerging markets. 
 
IV.3 Complementarities Among Pro-Growth Policies 
 
But the burden of jump-starting growth in developing countries has to fall 
primarily on pro-growth policies outside the macroeconomic arena.  Such policies 
include, for example, the implementation of an open international trade regime, the 
adoption of national innovation policies, well-functioning factor markets and an investor-
friendly legal and regulatory environment.  In some cases, those policies actually 
facilitate the adoption of reforms aimed at macroeconomic stability – e.g., disinflation or 
the correction of a real misalignment are easier and less costly to achieve with well-
functioning labor and financial markets. 
 
The key lesson is that policies of this type are mutually complementary with 
policies that focus on the creation and preservation of macroeconomic stability.  An 
unstable macroeconomic environment tends to undermine the growth benefits of such 
policies.   Nonetheless, what we have learned from the 1990s is that macro stability alone 
is not enough; policies outside the macroeconomic arena are themselves indispensable to 
harvest the fruits of macroeconomic stability in the form of sustained high rates of 
economic growth.  
                                                 
61 In the Chilean case, Forbes (2003) argues that these costs were substantial.  Johnson and Mitton (2002) 
find that in the case of Malaysia capital controls served to protect cronyism.    43
 
Box III.1. The Devaluation of the CFA Franc 
 
The CFA Zone consists of 14 West African countries that share a common currency, the 
CFA franc.  The 14 countries are divided into three groups: the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), the central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMC), and 
Comoros.  The WAEMU consists of seven former French colonies in West Africa (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo).  The CAEMC, in turn, includes 
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.  The 
WAEMU and CAEMC have separate regional central banks, known by their French acronyms 
BCEAO and BEAC, each of which issues its own version of the CFA franc, as does Comoros 
separately. 
 
Most of the countries in the CFA Zone have shared the CFA franc as a freely circulating 
common currency since pre-independence times.  From 1948 to 1993, the CFA franc was pegged 
to the French franc at the value of CFAF 50 = F 1.  Since, as the former colonial power, France 
has historically dominated the external trade of the member economies of the Zone, the fixity of 
the exchange rate against the French franc reflects, at least in part, a desire to minimize 
transactions costs in international trade   But it has also served to provide a nominal anchor for 
these economies.   
 
The fixed exchange rate against the French franc has effectively been guaranteed by 
France: the regional central banks maintain their foreign exchange reserves at the French 
Treasury and the latter ensures unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc into French francs 
through an “operations account” that essentially lends the regional central banks the French 
francs required to ensure convertibility.  In return, France is represented on the banks’ Boards of 
Directors.   
 
The CFA Zone, unlike the eurozone, did not impose explicit fiscal conditions for 
membership in the union.  However, some coordination of fiscal policies to prevent spillover 
problems has been attempted through the lending policies of the zone’s central banks.  This has 
taken two forms.  First, outstanding BCEAO credit to the governments of each of the member 
countries is restricted to be no more than 20 percent of that government’s tax receipts in the 
previous year.  Second, each year the BCEAO’s Board of Directors formulates plans for credit 
expansion to each member country that includes a ceiling on the flow of credit to each 
government.  Notice that, if effective, these restrictions would indeed help to safeguard the 
BCEAO from pressures for excessive monetary expansion driven by the fiscal needs of individual 
member countries, but unlike the Maastricht treaty, which circumscribes overall fiscal deficits 
and total public debt, they still leave individual countries with substantial discretion over their 
overall fiscal policies, because member country governments retain the latitude to finance fiscal 
deficits through means other than borrowing from the BCEAO. 
 
The common currency appears to have been reasonably effective in maintaining financial 
discipline in the member countries for an extended period. Until the mid 1980s, these countries 
enjoyed relatively lower inflation and more sustained economic growth than other Sub-Saharan 
African countries, despite the persistence of certain structural rigidities, particularly in labor 
markets.  But the shortcomings of the “hard” peg against the French franc became apparent in the 
mid-1980s, when the Zone was hit by two external shocks: a sharp deterioration in the terms of 
trade of its member countries arising from a decline in the world prices of its primary export 
commodities, and a strong appreciation of the French franc against the U.S. dollar.   These shocks 
placed strong pressures on fiscal outcomes in the Zone, heavily dependent on commodity   44
revenues and trade taxes. Member countries’ failure to impose an orderly correction, partly due to 
their inability to adjust public sector wages downward, led to sharply higher fiscal and current 
account deficits, large increases in external debt, and deteriorating growth performance relative to 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The CFA franc became substantially overvalued. 
 
To reverse the worsening economic performance, the overvaluation had to be eliminated, 
and this eventually led to the first major devaluation of the CFA franc, implemented on January 
12, 1994, when the official parity was changed to CFAF 100 = F 1.  The devaluation was 
accompanied by several ancillary measures, including measures to improve fiscal performance 
through a broadening of the tax base and a reduction of expenditures (mainly in the form of the 
public wage bill and subsidies to public enterprises), as well as structural reforms focused on 
trade liberalization, increasing flexibility in labor markets, reducing the direct role of government 
in production, and restructuring financial sectors. 
 
The results of the devaluation were on the whole quite positive.  Inflation accelerated 
briefly in 1994, but quickly converged to single-digit levels.  Consequently, the real effective 
depreciation of the CFE franc in 1994 amounted to about 30 percent (Clement et al, 1996).    Real 
GDP growth, which had been negative in 1993, averaged 1.3 percent for the Zone as a whole in 
1994, and accelerated subsequently.  Overall fiscal deficits, which had peaked at about 8 percent 
of GDP in 1993, had fallen to just over 2 percent of GDP by 1996.  Meanwhile, while investment 
increased slightly in the region as a whole, a substantial increase in saving rates resulted in a 
reduction in the current account deficit of some 2 percent of GDP between 1993 and 1996, and 
coupled with capital repatriation and renewed external assistance, the upshot was a large increase 
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